Growing apprehension is palpable in Bangladesh as the civil war in neighboring Myanmar inches closer to its border, with two deaths reported Tuesday when stray shells from Myanmar landed in a village in the hilly Bandarban District.

Aware of the rising threat, Bangladesh placed security forces on high alert along its 270-mile frontier with Myanmar's restive Rakhine state, with particular focus on the Naf River that serves as a natural boundary.

Historically known as Arakan, Myanmar's Rakhine state was the site of a brutal military crackdown in 2017 that drove more than 1 million ethnic Rohingyas to seek refuge in Bangladesh. Initially welcoming them with open arms, Bangladesh has since grown restless over their prolonged presence.

"Bangladesh shares a small border but a big issue with Myanmar," said Touhid Hossain, former foreign secretary of Bangladesh, describing the challenges of repatriation.

Although Myanmar's ruling military junta has agreed to take back the displaced Rohingyas, it has not agreed to grant them citizenship, while many of the Rohingya themselves refuse to return to life under a military junta they distrust.

A grim picture

Reports from the sprawling Rohingya camps in coastal Cox's Bazar, the southernmost district of Bangladesh, paint a grim picture of the nearby conflict. The sounds of gunfire and explosions in Rakhine resonate within the makeshift shelters, underscoring the reality of the situation.

The Arakan Army, a predominantly non-Rohingya rebel group fighting for an autonomous Rakhine state, launched a significant offensive last October, coordinating with other ethnic armed groups to place immense pressure on Myanmar's ruling military, known as the Tatmadaw. Reports suggest the Tatmadaw has retaliated with artillery bombardments, causing civilian casualties, including Rohingyas in Rakhine.

The death of villagers caused by stray shelling has increased domestic pressure on the Bangladesh government. Myanmar's ambassador in Dhaka was summoned on Tuesday to hear a "strong protest," Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud told reporters.

The Associated Press reported Monday that more than 100 members of Myanmar's border police force, many of them wounded, have taken refuge in Bangladesh, while regional news outlets put the number at more than 225.

Concerns conflict will spread

The primary concern in Dhaka, however, is that the conflict may spill over into Bangladesh itself.

Despite these fears, some observers call it unlikely.

"There is no chance of the fighting spilling over into Bangladesh," stated Mohammad Emdadul Islam, a retired army major who headed Bangladesh's consulate in Sittwe, Rakhine's capital, during the late 1990s and early 2000s. He argued that the Arakan Army would likely retreat north to Chin state and then onward to Kachin, avoiding direct confrontation with Bangladesh.

Former Secretary Hossain added that armed groups and any new influx of refugees would no longer be welcome in Bangladesh, which has grappled with displaced Rohingyas three times in four decades, most recently in 2017.

The scale and duration of the latest crisis, however, far exceeds previous scenarios. In 1979 and 1992, some quarter-million Rohingya refugees were repatriated within a year of arrival. Since 2017, Dhaka's diplomatic efforts have been stalled by the absence of safety guarantees and denials of citizenship, while broad international condemnation of Myanmar's military as perpetrators of genocide has failed to soften the junta's stance.

Even Dhaka's efforts to have China broker a deal with the Tatmadaw have yet to produce results.

But Islam, who has experience working with Myanmar's military, said the southeast Asian country's history of self-sufficiency and its insular outlook make it unusually resistant to international pressure, regardless of China's stance.

Against this backdrop, observers like Hossain in Dhaka see the recent escalation in fighting as a potential opportunity for change.

"Bangladesh has nothing to gain from the status quo," said Hossain, emphasizing the need for progress in negotiations.

Others, such as Dhaka-based international affairs researcher Md Himel Rahman, view the situation with trepidation.

"If the [Arakan Army] wins this war, Bangladesh will share borders with an unrecognized statelet," he wrote in The Diplomat. "If the [Arakan Army] loses this war, Bangladesh could witness an influx of disguised [Arakan Army] fighters into its territory."

Hossain, however, remains hopeful that negotiations involving the pro-democracy National Unity Government (NUG), formed by elements of the ousted civilian government, could play a significant role in resolving the crisis. He also sees the Arakan Army as a potential key player in the process.

On the eve of the coup's third anniversary, the NUG has reiterated its commitment to ending the military's political rule and transitioning the country back to civilian governance through negotiations. That potentially leaves the door open for talks, provided Myanmar's military accepts the NUG's political objectives.

Hossain believes that both the NUG and the Arakan Army could be pivotal in resolving the Rohingya crisis, pointing out that the NUG has already recognized the Rohingyas as citizens and promised them security and rights. He calls for Bangladesh to establish an informal channel of communication with the groups.

Islam, on the other hand, remains skeptical that the fighting bodes well for Bangladesh. He believes the Tatmadaw's policy toward Bangladesh is driven by deeply rooted concerns that a massive influx of Bangladeshi migrants - including the displaced Rohingya whom they often demean as "illegal Bengalis" - will return to Rakhine. (The Rohingya are a Muslim minority seen by many Myanmar Buddhists as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, a contentious claim that lacks strong historical evidence.)

Further complicating Dhaka's management of the crisis - the geopolitical rivalry between India and China.

Beijing's $7.3 billion Bay of Bengal deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu on the Rakhine coast, which has been in development since 2010, is expected to give China strategic access to the Indian Ocean, allowing it to bypass the narrow Strait of Malacca through which some 80% of its oil imports now arrive from the Middle East.

Meanwhile, India's development of a port in Sittwe got underway in 2023. It is the first node of a $484 million project aimed at connecting greater India with its landlocked northeast through western Myanmar's Rakhine and Chin states, bypassing Bangladesh.

Amid those challenges, Bangladesh is left to manage a delicate balancing act while hoping for a resolution to the Rohingya crisis and a peaceful resolution to the conflict on its border with Myanmar.

This story originated in VOA's Bangla Service.

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